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The discrete modulation can make up for the shortage of transmission distance in measurement-
device-independent continuous-variable quantum key distribution (MDI-CVQKD) that has an unique
advantage against all side-channel attacks but also challenging for the further performance improve-
ment. Here we suggest a quantum catalysis (QC) approach for enhancing the performance of the
discrete-modulated (DM) MDI-CVQKD in terms of the achievable secret key rate and lengthening the
maximal transmission distance. The numerical simulation results show that the QC-based MDI-CVQKD
with discrete modulation that involves a zero-photon catalysis (ZPC) operation can not only obtain a
higher secret key rate than the original DM protocol, but also contributes to the reasonable increase
of the corresponding optimal variance. As for the extreme asymmetric and symmetric cases, the se-
cret key rate and maximal transmission distance of the ZPC-involved DM MDI-CVQKD system can be
further improved under the same parameters. This approach enables the system to tolerate lower rec-
onciliation efficiency, which will promote the practical implementations with state-of-art technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–4], as one of the
most mature applications in cryptography, aims to share
secret keys between two distant legitimate users (Al-
ice and Bob) even in the presence of an eavesdropper
(Eve) [5–7]. Thanks to the usage of efficient detection
schemes, including the homodyne and heterodyne detec-
tions, the continuous variable (CV) QKD systems [8–12]
not only promise high key rates, but also can be easily
compatible with the current optical communication tech-
nologies. In particular, since the Gaussian-modulated
(GM) CVQKD protocol [9] has been theoretically proved
to be secure against collective attacks [13] and coherent
attacks [14], this protocol paves the way for the develop-
ment of commercial applications. For example, the field
tests of the CVQKD system over 50 km commercial fiber
have been achieved in recent years [15]. Whereas, in
practical implementations, the existence of imperfect de-
tectors may lead to the potential security loopholes that
could be successfully exploited by Eve to take some at-
tack strategies, e.g., the local oscillator calibration attack
[16], the wavelength attack [17], and the detector satu-
ration attack [18], which are still problems for realizing
the practical CVQKD system.
In response to these problems, the measurement-
device-independent (MDI) CVQKD protocols were pro-
posed [21–29], where the secret keys between Alice and
Bob can be extracted by relying on the measurement re-
sults of an untrusted third party (Charlie). This protocol
can be immune to all attacks on detectors, and its prac-
tical security proof has been analyzed in both the finite-
size effect [26, 27] and the composable security [28].
However, in contrast to its discrete-variable (DV) coun-
terpart [19, 20], this MDI-CVQKD has limitations in the
transmission distance, which is not sufficient for the re-
quirements of the long-distance communication. There-
fore, it is an urgent task to lengthen the maximal trans-
mission distance with underlying technology.
Up till now, most of investigations have focused on
performance improvement of the MDI-CVQKD system
by means of quantum operations [30–32], such as the
phase-sensitive optical amplifier and the photon subtrac-
tion. To be more specific, using a phase-sensitive op-
tical amplifier to compensate the imperfection of the
Bell-state measurement (BSM) implemented by Charlie
can improve the performance of the MDI-CVQKD sys-
tem [30]. In addition, the photon subtraction operations
[31, 32] have been used for lengthening the maximal
transmission distance of the MDI-CVQKD system, and
meanwhile these photon-subtracted operations can be
emulated by the non-Gaussian postselection in order to
circumvent the complexity of configurations. Despite ex-
isting the aforementioned advantages, the success prob-
ability of implementing photon-subtracted operations is
less than 0.25, which would lead to the limited perfor-
mance improvements [33, 34]. To eliminate this draw-
back, recently, the quantum catalysis [33–38] has been
viewed as another useful method to extend the maximal
transmission distance of the MDI-CVQKD system [39],
compared with the single-photon subtraction case. Un-
fortunately, a major problem, common to the aforemen-
tioned GM CVQKD, is that the reconciliation efficiency β
is low, especially on the long-distance transmission with
a low signal-to-noise ratio.
To solve this problem, there are two approaches. One
is to design effective reconciliation code, such as low-
density parity-check code [40] and multidimensional
reconciliation code [41], but this kind of design has a
higher cost of hardwares and is hard to be realized in
practice, and the alternative is to employ the discrete-
modulated (DM) schemes [42–49], including the four-
state protocol and the eight-state protocol, which allows
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2the distribution of secret keys over long distances in the
regime of low signal-to-noise ratio with an efficient rec-
onciliation efficiency. Recently, it has been shown [46]
that the DM-based MDI-CVQKD under the extreme asym-
metric case rather than the symmetric case has an ad-
vantage over the GM-based one with respect to the max-
imal transmission distance. Motivated by the advantages
of the DM schemes with an efficient reconciliation effi-
ciency, in this paper, we put forward a feasible method
using a zero-photon catalysis (ZPC) operation in order
to further enhance the performance of MDI-CVQKD with
discrete modulation. Our results under the same accessi-
ble parameters show that, as for the extreme asymmetric
and symmetric cases, the usage of the ZPC operation on
MDI-CVQKD with discrete modulation can not only give
birth to the high secret key rates, but also contributes
to the reasonable increase of the corresponding optimal
variance. Furthermore, the maximal transmission dis-
tance can be lengthened when comparing with the tradi-
tional DM scheme. More interestingly, our protocol en-
ables the MDI-CVQKD with discrete modulation to toler-
ate lower reconciliation efficiency.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In
Sec. II, we first review the entanglement-based (EB) ver-
sion of the original DM MDI-CVQKD protocol and then
demonstrate the effects of the ZPC operation on MDI-
CVQKD with discrete modulation in detail. In Sec. III,
according to the optimality of Gaussian attack, we de-
rive the asymptotic secret key rate of the ZPC-involved
MDI-CVQKD with discrete modulation. In Sec. IV, the
simulation results and discussions are provided. Finally,
our conclusions are drawn in Sec. V.
II. ZPC-INVOLVED MDI-CVQKD PROTOCOL WITH
DISCRETE MODULATION
The EB version of MDI-CVQKD with discrete modu-
lation is shown in Fig. 1(a), where Alice and Bob re-
spectively generate a two-mode entangled state |Φ4〉AA1
and |Φ4〉BB1 , and then both of them respectively hold
modes A and B while sending modes A1 and B1, along
with the quantum channels of lengths LAC and LBC ,
to an untrusted third party Charlie who proceeds to in-
terfere with the incoming modes A1 and B1 at a sym-
metric beam splitter, and attains two output modes C1
and C2. After the x (p) quadrature of mode C1 (C2)
is measured by the BSM, Charlie proclaims the mea-
sured results {XC1 , PC2}. Subsequently, Bob modifies
mode B to B˜ by using a displacement operation D (γ)
according to the public results {XC1 , PC2} , where γ =
g (XC1 + iPC2) with the gain g of a displacement opera-
tion. Through heterodyne detections, Alice and Bob re-
spectively measure mode A and B˜ to attain the outcome
results {XA, PA} and {XB , PB} , and finally both of them
have to implement the postprocessing to get a string of
secret keys.
In what follows, we focus on the ZPC-involved MDI-
CVQKD with discrete modulation. For the sake of discus-
sions, here we take the EB version of the four-state pro-
tocol into account. As shown in Fig. 1(b), in the Alice’s
station, Alice prepares for the two-mode entangled state
|Φ4〉AA1 on modes A and A1 with a modulated variance
VM = 2α
2 = VA − 1 given by
|Φ4〉AA1 =
3∑
l=0
√
λl |φl〉A |φl〉A1
=
1
2
3∑
l=0
√
λl |ϕl〉A |αl〉A1 , (1)
where the non-Gaussian orthogonal state |ϕl〉A on mode
A is expressed as
|ϕl〉A =
1
2
3∑
j=0
ei(2l+1)jpi/4 |φj〉A , (l = 0, 1, 2, 3) , (2)
with
|φl〉 = e
−α2/2
√
λl
3∑
m=0
(−1)m α4m+l√
(4m+ l)!
|4m+ l〉 , (3)
λ0,2 =
e−α
2
2
[
coshα2 ± cosα2] ,
λ1,3 =
e−α
2
2
[
sinhα2 ± sinα2] , (4)
and |αl〉A1 =
∣∣αei(2l+1)pi/4〉 (l = 0, 1, 2, 3) on mode A1
is a modulated coherent state with a positive number α.
Note that, one of the states |αl〉A1with the same probabil-
ity 1/4 is randomly sent to Charlie through an unsecure
quantum channel. Thus, the corresponding covariance
matrix ΓAA1 of the resending state |Φ4〉AA1 is
ΓAA1 =
(
XI2 Z4σz
Z4σz XI2
)
, (5)
where I2 =diag(1, 1) , σz =diag(1,−1) , and
X = 1 + 2α2, Z4 = 2α
2
3∑
k=0
λ
3/2
k−1λ
−1/2
k . (6)
In order to lower requirements for device perfection of
the quantum catalysis, we assume that, for our protocol,
an untrusted third party, David, who is near Alice, con-
trols the ZPC operation (magenta box) where a vacuum
state |0〉D in an auxiliary mode D is injected into the
beam splitter (BS) with a transmittance T , and simulta-
neously an ideal on/off detector placed at the output port
of mode D is used for registering the same state |0〉D. As
shown in Refs. [33, 34], the vacuum state |0〉D between
the input and output ports seems to be unchanged, but
promotes the transformation of quantum states between
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FIG. 1: (Color online) (a) EB version of the original MDI-CVQKD with discrete modulation. (b) EB version of the ZPC-involved
MDI-CVQKD with discrete modulation. (c) Equivalent one-way CVQKD protocol with the ZPC operation under the assumption
that Bob’s prepared state |Φ4〉BB1 and displacement except for heterodyne detection are untrusted. Both |Φ4〉AA1 and |Φ4〉BB1
are the two-mode entangled states. 50:50 is a balanced beam splitter. BS is a beam splitter with a transmittance T . BSM is a
Bell-state measurement. Het and Hom are respectively a heterodyne detection and a homodyne detection. {Xj , Pj} (j = A,B)
is the outcome results of the heterodyne detection. XC1 (or PC2) is the outcome results of the BSM. D (γ) is a displacement
operator. Πoff = |0〉D 〈0| is a projective operator. Tj and ξj (j = A,B) are respectively the quantum channel transmittance and
the excess noise. TC and εth are respectively the equivalent quantum channel transmittance and excess noise of the equivalent
one-way protocol.
modes A1 and A2. Moreover, this ZPC operation can be
described as an equivalent operator
Ô0 = Tr
[
ΠoffB (T )
]
=
√
T
b†b
, (7)
where B (T ) = exp
[(
ad† − a†d) arccos√T] is a BS op-
erator and Πoff = |0〉D 〈0| is a projective operator on
mode D. In addition, when such an operation is applied
to an arbitrary coherent state |α〉, one can obtain
|ψ〉out =
Ô0√
Pd
|α〉
=
exp[− |α|22 (1− T )]√
Pd
∣∣∣√Tα〉 , (8)
where Pd = exp[− |α|2 (1− T )] presents the success
probability of implementing such an operation. Evi-
dently, with the assistant of the ZPC, the conversion of
quantum states from |α〉 to
∣∣∣√Tα〉 can be achieved with
the probability Pd. Thus, when one mode A1 of the
states |Φ4〉AA1 is sent by Alice, the travelling state af-
ter succeeding in the ZPC operation can be expressed
as |Φ4〉AA2 =
∑3
l=0
√
λl/2 |ϕl〉A |α˜l〉A2 with a covariance
matrix
ΓAA2 =
(
X˜I2 Z˜4σz
Z˜4σz X˜I2
)
, (9)
where X˜ and Z˜4 can be obtained by replacing α with α˜
in Eq. (5), and |α˜l〉A2 =
∣∣α˜ei(2l+1)pi/4〉
A2
with α˜ =
√
Tα.
It should be noted that after performing the ZPC opera-
tion, the actual modulated variance of the travelling state
|Φ4〉AA2 turns out to be V˜M = T (VA − 1) . At the Bob’s
station, for simplicity, we assume that the variance of the
two-mode entangled state |Φ4〉BB1 is the same as that of
the state |Φ4〉AA1 , i.e., VA = VB = V throughout this
paper. Besides, due to the fact that Alice and Bob carry
out the same discrete modulation, the way of attaining
the covariance matrix ΓBB1 is the same as the Eq. (5).
III. THE SECRET KEY RATE OF THE ZPC-INVOLVED
MDI-CVQKD SYSTEM
So far, we have established the schematic structure of
the EB version of the ZPC-involved MDI-CVQKD system
with discrete modulation. In this section, for the re-
verse reconciliation algorithm, we pay attention to the
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The secret key rate versus the variance V for (a) the extreme asymmetric case and (b) the symmetric
case with transmission distances {25km, 30km, 35km} and {0.1km 0.2km, 0.3 km} when optimizing over the transmittance T
shown in (c) and (d), respectively. Note that ZPC Protocol and Original Protocol represent the ZPC-involved MDI-CVQKD and the
original MDI-CVQKD with discrete modulation. Other parameters are given by reconciliation efficiency β = 0.95 and excess noise
ξj = ξ = 0.002 for j ∈ {A,B}
derivation of asymptotic secret key rates against one-
mode collective Gaussian attacks [13, 50] where two
Markovian memoryless Gaussian quantum channels are
not related [51]. Here we consider the results that the
both channels between Alice (or Bob) and Charlie are
Gaussian under the condition of the modulated variance
VM = V − 1 < 0.5 [42–46], which arises from the in-
distinguishability of Z4 and ZG =
√
V 2 − 1. It means
that the DM scheme can be viewed as the GM one when
satisfying the condition of VM < 1.5. In Fig. 1(b), we as-
sume that the losses of both channels are κ = 0.2 dB/km,
while TA = 10−κLAC/10 (TB = 10−κLBC/10) and ξA (ξB)
respectively represent the transmittance and excess noise
of the channel between Alice (Bob) and Charlie. As re-
ferred to Refs. [21–28, 30–32], the EB version of the
MDI-CVQKD system can be equivalent to a conventional
5one-way CVQKD system with the assumption that both
the state |Φ4〉BB1 and the displacement operation D (γ)
in Bob’s station are untrusted except for the heterodyne
detection, as shown in Fig. 1(c). For the equivalent sys-
tem, TC and εth are respectively the equivalent quantum
channel transmittance and excess noise through the re-
lations
TC =
g2TA
2
,
εth = 1 + χA +
TB
TA
(χB − 1)
+
TB
TA
(√
2 (VB − 1)
g2TB
−
√
VB + 1
)2
, (10)
where χj = (1− Tj) /Tj + ξj (j = A,B). Further, by
setting g2 = 2 (VB − 1) / [(VB + 1)TB ], one can derive
the minimum εth, i.e.,
εth =
TB
TA
(χB − 1) + 1 + χA. (11)
Although the imperfection of the BSM in Charlie is an
inescapable event, such an imperfection can be compen-
sated by optical preamplifiers [32, 52, 53]. For simplicity,
we consider the assumption of the perfection detection
for performance analysis. Consequently, the total noise
of the channel input in the shot-noise units (SNU) can be
expressed as χt = (1− TC) /TC + εth.
According to the aforementioned analysis, after per-
forming the BSM and the displacement operation, the
covariance matrix ΓAB˜ of the state |Φ4〉AB˜ is
ΓAB˜ =
(
aI2 cσz
cσz bI2
)
=
(
X˜I2
√
TCZ˜4σz√
TCZ˜4σz TC
(
X˜ + χt
)
I2
)
. (12)
We note that the ZPC operation belongs to a kind of
Gaussian operation, which makes it possible to derive the
secret key rates by using the results of the extremality of
Gaussian quantum states [54]. Thus, we have the secret
key rate of the ZPC-involved MDI-CVQKD system with
discrete modulation under reverse reconciliation against
one-mode collective Gaussian attacks, i.e.,
K = Pd {βI (A:B)− χ (B:E)} , (13)
where the success probability Pd has been given in Eq.
(8), β denotes a reverse-reconciliation efficiency, I (A:B)
denotes the Shannon mutual information between Alice
and Bob, which can be derived as
I (A:B) = log2
a+ 1
a+ 1− c2/ (Y + 1) , (14)
and χ (B:E) denotes the Holevo bound between Bob and
Eve. To obtain this Holevo bound, we assume that Eve is
aware of the untrusted third party David, and can purify
the whole system ρAB˜ED, so that
χ (B:E) = S (E)− S (E|B)
= S
(
AB˜
)
− S
(
A|B˜mB
)
,
=
2∑
i=1
G
[
λi − 1
2
]
−G
[
λ3 − 1
2
]
, (15)
where G [x] = (x+ 1) log2 (x+ 1)−x log2 x, S
(
AB˜
)
is a
function of the symplectic eigenvalues λ1,2 of ΓAB˜ given
by
λ21,2 =
1
2
[
ϑ±
√
ϑ2 − 4ζ2
]
, (16)
with ϑ = a2 + b2 − 2c2 and ζ = ab − c2, and Eve’s con-
dition entropy S(A|B˜mB ) based on Bob’s measurement
result mB , is a function of the symplectic eigenvalues λ3
of ΓmBA = aI2 − cσz (Y I2 + I2)−1 cσz, which is given by
λ3 =
a (b+ 1)− c2
b+ 1
. (17)
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In the traditional MDI-CVQKD system, most of investi-
gations show that the extreme asymmetric case has the
best performance when comparing with the symmetric
case (LAC = LBC) [21–28, 30–32]. That is, if Char-
lie is close to Bob, then the extreme asymmetric case
(LBC = 0) is more suitable for the point-to-point com-
munication in contrast to the symmetric case, enabling
us to achieve the maximal transmission distance. Dif-
ferent from the former, the latter has an unique short-
distance network application, e.g., the quantum repeater
where the relay (Charlie) has to be placed in the mid-
dle of the legitimate communication parties. To extract
the maximal secret key rates as many as possible, in the
following, we demonstrate the optimal area and value
of the variance V that is an important factor of affecting
the performance of MDI-CVQKD systems with discrete
modulation, and then proceed with the security analysis,
including the extreme asymmetric and symmetric cases.
A. Parameter optimization
Now, let us examine the optimal area and value of V
in the ZPC-involved DM MDI-CVQKD system, which de-
termines the transmitting power of the quantum signal,
thereby impacting the performance of the CVQKD sys-
tems. We note that the actual modulated variance V˜M
of the proposed system is expressed as V˜M = V˜ − 1 =
T (V − 1) according to the relation of α˜ = √Tα, which
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The secret key rate versus the transmission distance for (a) the extreme asymmetric case and (b) the sym-
metric case with several different excess noises ξj = ξ ∈ {0.002, 0.0025, 0.003} (j = A,B) when optimizing over the transmittance
T shown in (c) and (d), respectively. Note that ZPC Protocol and Original Protocol represent the ZPC-involved DM MDI-CVQKD
and the original DM MDI-CVQKD. Other parameters are fixed as follows: reconciliation efficiency is β = 0.95, optimal variances
V for the original protocol is 1.4 in the extreme asymmetric case (1.5 in the symmetric case), optimal variances V for the ZPC
protocol is 2.5 in the extreme asymmetric case (2.6 in the symmetric case).
means that the value of V can be expanded appropri-
ately by using the ZPC operation on DM MDI-CVQKD. To
understand this point, for the given β = 0.95, Figs. 2
(a) and 2(b) show the secret key rates as a function of
the variance V with the extreme asymmetric and sym-
metric cases, when optimizing over the transmittance T
shown in Figs. 2(c) and 2(d), respectively. As for the
original DM MDI-CVQKD protocols (solid line), includ-
ing the extreme asymmetric and symmetric cases, the
optimal areas of V are gradually compressed with the de-
crease of the transmission distance, whereas for the ZPC-
involved DM MDI-CVQKD protocols (dashed line), the
secret key rate decreases much more slowly with the in-
crease of V . In other words, the ZPC-involved protocols
have much larger optimal areas of V than the original
protocols, which implies that employing the ZPC opera-
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The tolerate excess noise versus the transmission distance for (a) the extreme asymmetric case and (b) the
symmetric case when optimized over the transmittance T . Note that ZPC Protocol and Original Protocol represent the ZPC-involved
DM MDI-CVQKD and the original DM MDI-CVQKD. Other parameters are fixed as follows: reconciliation efficiency is β = 0.95,
optimal variances V for the original protocol is 1.4 in the extreme asymmetric case (1.5 in the symmetric case), optimal variances
V for the ZPC protocol is 2.5 in the extreme asymmetric case (2.6 in the symmetric case).
tion on the DM MDI-CVQKD systems would bring about
more flexible and stable performances. We also notice
that, when V exceeds a certain threshold, the secret key
rate of the ZPC-involved DM MDI-CVQKD system can be
higher than that of the original one, which reveals that
the usage of the ZPC operation can offer a possible way
to increase the secret key rate well. To be specific, for
the original protocols, the optimal value of V under the
extreme asymmetric case (the symmetric case) is about
1.4 (1.5) with several different transmission distances,
e.g., 25km, 30km and 35km (0.1km, 0.2km and 0.3km),
as described in Ref. [46]. While for the proposed pro-
tocols, we find that the correspondingly optimal V un-
der the extreme asymmetric case (the symmetric case) is
about 2.5 (2.6). As shown in Figs. 2(c) and 2(d), the
corresponding transmittances are, respectively, given by
T ∈ {0.275, 0.266, 0.258} and T ∈ {0.312, 0.311, 0.310}
so that the modulated variance V˜M of the proposed pro-
tocols can also satisfy the constraint V˜M < 0.5. Thus, in
the following, we shall show the best performance of the
DM MDI-CVQKD system when taking into account these
optimal variances.
B. Security analysis
The security of the traditional QKD systems can be re-
flected from three aspects, i.e., the secret key rate, the
tolerable excess noise and the transmission distance. In
what follows, we focus on the security analysis of the
ZPC-involved DM MDI-CVQKD system, including the ex-
treme asymmetric and symmetric cases, compared with
the original DM MDI-CVQKD.
In Figs. 3(a) and 3(b), we illustrate the secret key
rate of both protocols versus the transmission distance
with the special two cases, i.e., the extreme asymmetric
case and the symmetric case, optimized over the trans-
mittance T depicted in Figs. 3(c) and 3(d), respectively.
The solid lines denote that the original protocols, which
can be surpassed by the protocols using the ZPC opera-
tion in terms of the secret key rate and the transmission
distance. Compared with the original protocol, the trans-
mission distance of the proposed protocol is closer to the
PLOB bound [55] that represents the ultimate limit of
repeaterless communications. One reason is that, by reg-
ulating the transmittance T , the optimal variance V for
the latter can be obtained in the long-distance communi-
cation, and can be bigger than the former case (V = 1.4
under the extreme asymmetric case and V = 1.5 under
the symmetric case). The other is that the ZPC opera-
tion can be indeed viewed as a noiseless linear attenu-
ation, which has been used for improving the transmis-
sion distance [56]. In addition, when comparing with
the extreme asymmetric case, the performance of both
protocols in the symmetric case is very poor under the
same parameters, because the gap of the excess noise
between the extreme asymmetric and symmetric cases
becomes large with the increase of the transmission dis-
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The secret key rate versus the reconciliation efficiency β for (a) the extreme asymmetric case and (b) the
symmetric case with with several different transmission distances e.g., 25km, 30km, 35km and 0.1km 0.2km, 0.3km when optimized
over the transmittance T , respectively. Note that ZPC Protocol and Original Protocol represent the ZPC-involved DM MDI-CVQKD
and the original DM MDI-CVQKD. Other parameters are fixed as follows: excess nosie is ξj = ξ = 0.002 (j = A,B), optimal
variances V for the original protocol is 1.4 in the extreme asymmetric case (1.5 in the symmetric case), optimal variances V for the
ZPC protocol is 2.5 in the extreme asymmetric case (2.6 in the symmetric case).
tance [46]. We find that the performances of the above
DM MDI-CVQKD systems, even with the ZPC operation,
are affected by the increase of ξ = 0.002, 0.0025 and
0.003, especially in terms of the maximal transmission
distance. It reveals that the above-mentioned protocols
are sensitive to the excess noise. To further understand
this point, Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) show the tolerable ex-
cess noise as a function of the transmission distance with
the extreme asymmetric and symmetric cases, when tak-
ing into account each possible transmittance T . We find
that, with the help of the ZPC operation, the tolerable
excess noise of the proposed protocol can be further im-
proved, which implies that under the same acceptable
excess noise, the ZPC-involved DM MDI-CVQKD proto-
col has obvious advantages over the original protocol in
terms of the maximal transmission distance. In partic-
ular, when ξ ≈ 0.001, the proposed protocol is able to
support a robust DM MDI-CVQKD system over long dis-
tance about 56km. However, there is a serious problem
that, as for the extreme asymmetric and symmetric cases,
once the excess noise of both protocols is greater than a
certain threshold (about 0.015 for the proposed protocol
and 0.011 for the original protocol), we can not achieve
the positive secret key rate. To solve this problem, for-
tunately, a new two-way CVQKD to improve robustness
against excess noise has been proposed [57]. We also no-
tice that, with the increase of transmission distance, the
excess noise of both protocols in the symmetric case falls
faster than that in the extreme asymmetric one, thereby
making these protocols perform worse than the extreme
asymmetric case with respect to long-distance communi-
cation.
The reconciliation efficiency β, on the other hand, is
an important indicator of extracting secret key informa-
tion. As shown in Figs 5(a) and 5(b), we give the secret
key rate versus the reconciliation efficiency β with the
extreme asymmetric and symmetric cases, respectively.
We find that, in the extreme asymmetric case, the avail-
able range of β for both the proposed protocol (dashed
lines) and the original protocol (solid lines) narrows as
the transmission distance increases. Moreover, for the
given transmission distance, the performance of the ZPC-
involved DM MDI-CVQKD system is always better than
that of the original one with respect to the secret key
rate and the tolerant of β. This phenomenon may be
caused by two aspects that the optimal V can be legiti-
mately expanded by using the ZPC operation on the DM
MDI-CVQKD system (shown in Figs. 2(a) and 2(b)) and
the system with discrete modulation works well at the
extremely low signal-to-noise ratio with a high-efficiency
error correction code in the reconciliation process. These
results are also true for the symmetric case, as illustrated
in Fig. 5(b). In this sense, it reveals that compared
with the original protocol, the ZPC-involved DM MDI-
CVQKD protocol in the symmetric case is more beneficial
for short-distance communication, especially under the
9low reconciliation efficiency.
V. CONCLUSION
We have suggested the performance improvement of
the MDI-CVQKD with discrete modulation by perform-
ing the ZPC operation. We focus on the conventional
four-state scheme as the representation of the DM-based
CVQKD system. Due to the benefits of a high-efficiency
error correction code in the reconciliation process, this
four-state-based scheme may offers a possible way to ex-
tend the maximal transmission distance. In the context
of an asymptotic-regime security analysis including the
extreme asymmetric and symmetric cases, our results un-
der the same accessible parameters show that the secret
key rate of the ZPC-involved DM MDI-CVQKD protocol
can be increased, compared with the original protocol.
In addition, the performance of the ZPC-involved pro-
tocol is always superior to that of the original one in
terms of the maximal transmission distance. Further-
more, we find that our protocol enables the DM MDI-
CVQKD system to tolerate more lower reconciliation ef-
ficiency. However, the tolerable excess noise of the both
protocols, especially for the symmetric case, decreases
with the increase of the transmission distance, which re-
strains the effects of extending the security transmission
distance. Fortunately, the two-way CVQKD protocol to
tolerate more excess noise than the one-way protocol
was first proposed by S. Pirandola [57], which paves the
way for our future investigations in the development of
lengthening the security transmission distance.
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